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Abstract 375
1This paper is based on Hakfoort and Weigand (2000) which describes the Dutch market for consumer
magazines in more detail.
2See Rosse (1970), Bucklin, Caves and Lo (1989) and Dertouzos and Trautman (1990) for formalized
models of a profit maximizing newspaper publisher. These models however are not used to discuss the
subsidization issue we are going to highlight but rather provide the starting point for deriving systems of
regression equations.
1. Introduction
The rapid emergence of new information and communication technologies (ICT) during
the 1980s and 1990s has led a long line of observers to point to the "drastic" changes
that are expected to result from a broad adoption of innovations such as the PC and the
Internet. A common observation in the literature is, for example, that ICT leads to a
structural break in the way firms conduct business. The publishing industry is a natural
choice to examine how ICT affects business strategies and market structure because this
industry produces information goods (IGs). IGs are characterised by a high fixed - low
marginal cost production technology. Furthermore, in many markets for information
goods, advertising is important to subsidize content. The first point implies that  average
unit cost declines in circulation. The second point suggests that revenue from selling
advertising space can be used to cover fixed costs. Given these two characteristics,
business strategies of publishers in these markets may be different from what traditional
industrial organization models predict for (perfectly delineated) single-product markets.
In this study
1, we present a simple model of a monopoly publisher to understand
pricing behaviour on the connected markets for readership and advertising. The
implications of the model will then be tested empirically by applying a panel data set
of 71 Dutch consumer magazines over the period 1990 - 1998. Our analysis contributes
not only to the theoretical and empirical literature on the functioning of markets for
newspapers and magazines but also allows us to draw more general conclusions which
can be expected to hold for information goods markets where advertising is important
2.
The study is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the characteristics of
information goods and how they relate to consumer magazines. Section 3 introduces a
simple model to make the link in pricing behaviour between the two connected markets
explicit. Section 4 describes the Dutch market for consumer magazines and the panel
data set. Section 5 presents the empirical evidence and section 6 concludes with a
discussion of the antitrust implications. 6
3Consumer magazines are "targeted at a (very) general readership of women, men, youths, children, or
families. The content is informative and/or entertaining. The magazine must be commercially exploited by
sale on the free market for readers and/or advertising space. Consumer magazines include magazines for
women (the so-called glossies), the family, and the youth as well as special-interest magazines." (NUV, 2000,
http://www.nuv.nl). Consumer magazines thus cater to a non-professional audience and are determined for
sale on the the free market nation-wide. By contrast, professional magazines target a specific profession, trade
(including free professions, services, institutions, government), or field of science (e.g. economics). For some
magazines the distinction between the two groups is blurred. 
4The non-rival character is recognized in the Netherlands by the popularity of the so-called
"leesportefeuille". This portfolio is a collection of magazines distributed immediately after the issues are
published and redistributed week after week until the final household becomes the owner of the
leesportefeuille. The price of a subscription to the leesportefeuille decreases with the time elapsed since the
issues’ publication dates. In some cases, magazines depend for more than 40 % of their circulation on this
distribution channel, typically if the content has no "news" component (e.g. comics).
2. Consumer magazines as information goods
At first glance, the market for consumer magazines
3 may not seem to be worth
investigating in greater detail. However, consumer magazines exhibit some of the
characteristics of information goods which are centre stage in the discussion on the
Information Economy or the New Economy (see Shapiro and Varian, 1999; Canoy (ed.),
2000). Information goods have a strong experience component, can often be consumed
by more than one consumer at the same time, the cost structure exhibits high fixed cost -
low marginal cost and they can be financed through advertising. In some cases,
information good markets also experience network and hardware/software effects.
A magazine is the prototype of an experience good, the value of which is only
recognized by the consumer after it is consumed. Consumer magazines are non-rival
goods. After having been read by one consumer it can be read by another consumer at
negligible costs
4.
Producing the original, particularly when setting up a new magazine, may involve
high fixed costs resulting from investing in and maintaining cost-intensive printing
facilities, editorial staff, distribution channels etc. "First-copy" costs can therefore be
expected to be high but may decrease rapidly as circulation increases. By contrast, the
marginal cost of production, that is the cost of producing copies from the original, and
the marginal cost of distributing the magazine to downstream suppliers or readers may
be very low compared to the fixed costs of creating the original. No detailed information
on the cost structures of Dutch consumer magazines is publicly available. However, it
is possible to present averages for the magazine publishing industry and compare it to
e.g. newspaper publishing and the average manufacturing firm. Over the period 1978
to 1992, magazine publishers had a substantially lower payroll/turnover ratio (22.2 %)7
5These averages are calculated from confidential plant-level data collected by the Dutch Statistical Office
(CBS, The Hague). For that reason, it is not possible to distinguish between publishing of consumer and
professional magazines or to report more specific descriptive statistics. Interestingly, the payroll share of 22.2
% very closely corresponds to the 22.8 % average payroll share that Heinrich (1994) reports for German
magazine publishers. For German publishers, Heinrich (1994) finds a fixed costs/turnover ratio of 38 % for
magazine publishing and 53 % for newspapers. Payroll accounted for 60 % of fixed costs of magazine
publishing and for 75 % of fixed costs of newspaper publishing. Payroll accounted for 60 % of fixed costs
of newspaper publishing. Costs that varied with circulation amounted to 46 % of turnover for magazines and
34 % for newspapers.
6Heinrich (1994) found that, in 1990, German publishers of daily newspapers made on average 64.8 %
of  total revenue from selling advertising space. For opinion magazines the share was 62.8 %, and for general
interest titles 42.1 %. Barely any information is available on Dutch publishers’s share of advertising in total
revenues. For 1998, the publishing group De Telegraaf reported 51 % of total revenues to be obtained from
advertising in its newspapers and magazines. 
but a higher share of expenses for input factors (raw materials etc., 49.8 %) than both
newspaper publishers (30.8 %, 47.2 %) and the average manufacturing firm (32.7%,
45.1 %)
5. In sum, the "high fixed, low marginal cost structure" characteristic of
information goods is less pronounced in the market for consumer magazines than in
some other markets (such as computer software). Although publishers certainly have to
incur fixed costs to launch a magazine (including format, styling, advertising, and so
on), these fixed costs do not seem to be dramatically different from the average
manufacturing firm. Further, marginal cost, even if not directly observable, will not
converge to zero with increasing the number of copies because costs of materials (paper,
ink, etc.), editorial work, and distribution have to be incurred.
Another feature of information goods is the possibility to subsidize or sponsor
content by advertising. Mixing content and advertisements is a general strategy of
publishers in the market for consumer magazines. Advertising is the most important
source of revenue for most publishers
6. In general, the advertising market is more
volatile than the readership market. In the market for advertising expenditures, magazine
publishers compete with other media such as newspapers, radio, television and
billboards. Over the period 1990 - 1998, the share of press media (i.e. newspapers, door-
to-door magazines, consumer magazines and professional magazines) in total
advertising expenditures in the Netherlands decreased from 67 % in 1989 to 58 % in
1998 (BBC/VEA, 1999). The share of consumer magazines within this category has
slightly gone up from 12 % in 1989 to 14 % in 1998. Over the whole range however,
advertising expenditures allocated to consumer magazines have been decreasing, while
expenditures spent on ads on TV or in address books have been on the rise. Magazine
publishers have thus been trying to reduce the dependency on advertising revenues.
Network effects and hardware dependency may not be quite obvious to exist.
However, in the case of launching a magazine, publishers use a variety of strategies8
7See Canoy (ed.) (2000) for a more thorough discussion.
8These simplifications do not alter any of the key insights of the model but reduce notational efforts
substantially.
similar to those in markets with network effects. These strategies include giving away
free copies, free subscriptions, or revealing parts of the content to build up a readership
base which, in turn, is attractive for advertisers
7. Offering favourable advertising rates
to advertisers that "take the gamble" to advertise in a newly launched magazine is a
similar strategy to give the new magazine momentum. Furthermore, some experiments
with the electronic delivery of magazines are also being undertaken. Therefore, the new
hardware feature may become much more important in the future.
3. The economics of magazine publishing
This section focuses on the advertising feature and its impact on pricing. A newspaper
or magazine satisfies the demands of two customer groups simultaneously. News or
entertainment is sold to readers and advertising space to advertisers. Conventional
wisdom holds that newsstand and subscription prices are "subsidized" through the
revenue from selling advertising space (see Lacy and Simon, 1993; Belch and Belch,
1995). As argued by Corden (1953) in a pioneering study on the economics of
newspaper publishing, the price charged for advertising space depends on the circulation
of the magazine, that is, the amount of copies sold to the readership per issue of the
magazine. To make the link in pricing between the two markets, the market for readers
and the markets for ads, more explicit, we will use a simple model of a monopoly
publisher. For simplicity, we assume that the monopoly publisher produces a single
magazine under perfect information and certainty regarding costs and demands. Readers
are perfectly informed about the quality of content
8 . We will use the following notation:
p cover (newsstand) price of the magazine
r ad-rate, i.e. price for full-page ads
q circulation of the magazine
n number of pages per issue allotted to editorials




We assume also that the space dedicated to editorials (news, entertainment) and ads can
be measured in full pages so that n + a yields the total number of pages per issue of the
magazine. The publisher maximizes the profit function given by (1)
max
q,a,n π =+ − p(q,k)q r(a,q) C(q,a,n) (1)
by choice of circulation as well as editorial and ad space. The cover price is assumed to
be a function of circulation and the share of editorial pages in total pages. Since the
monopolist faces a downward sloping demand curve, a higher circulation can only be
sold to the readership at a lower cover price, implying the standard inverse price-
quantity relation.
Readers are assumed to be willing to pay more for a magazine if the editorial share
increases so that p and k are positively related. The ad rate depends inversely on ad-
space. As argued above, circulation is important for advertisers. One would suspect that
advertisers demand more ad-space or are willing to pay a higher ad-rate per ad-page if
circulation is higher, because they can reach a bigger audience. However, a positive
relationship is not the only plausible possibility. Advertisers usually target readership
groups with specific characteristics (income, age etc.). With increasing circulation the
readership demographics may change such that the impact of ads on targeted groups
may be diluted. Under these conditions, ad-rate and circulation are inversely related.
Total cost, C, is a positive function of circulation, ads and editorials. We further
assume marginal cost of circulation, ads and editorials to be positive and, for simplicity,
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"circulation" elasticity of ad-rate,
the first-order conditions of maximising (1) through choice of q, a and n can be




















Equation (2) describes pricing in the readership market. The relative mark-up of cover
price over marginal cost in circulation is inversely related to the readership’s demand
elasticity as in the standard monopoly case. At a given demand elasticity gp, the mark-up
now depends on the ratio of revenues from selling advertising space to revenues from
selling the circulation as well as on the circulation elasticity. Thus, if circulation
positively affects the demand for advertising, the publisher will set a lower cover price
to increase circulation, attracting more advertising demand which raises revenue from11
selling advertising space. The cover price will be lower the more revenue can be made
from advertising relative to the revenue from circulation.
If revenue from advertising is relatively high compared to the revenue from
circulation, or alternatively, the circulation elasticity of ad-demand is positive and large,
the monopolist will set the cover price below marginal cost of circulation. Therefore,
as conventional wisdom holds, readers benefit from the presence of ads in a magazine
by being charged a lower price than they would have to pay for an ad-free magazine. If
there is no impact of circulation on demand (" = 0) equation (2) reduces to standard
monopoly pricing. If advertisers do not like high circulation but prefer niches, the
publisher will set a higher cover price to reduce readership demand.
Equation (3) describes pricing in the advertising market. Here the publisher charges
a higher price than in the standard one-product monopoly case. Advertisers thus pay for
the (marginal) costs of producing editorial content. The impact of competition in the
advertising market on both ad-price and cover price can be easily concluded from (3).
Competition in the form of new publishers entering the market and offering close
substitutes to the established magazine means that advertisers have opportunities to
advertise in competing magazines. With competition the price elasticity of advertisers’
demand will increase, reducing the publishers’ pricing power in the advertising market
and squeezing her revenues. The established publisher must then charge a higher cover
price, given that the price elasticity of readership demand remains unchanged. Raising
cover price will be harder for a single publisher the more magazines compete for the
same readership, that is, the more magazines are close substitutes from the reader’s
perspective.
Equation (3) also depicts the impact of the editorials-to-ads ratio on cover price.
Extending editorials at the expense of ad-pages, that is, raising k, gives rise to higher
marginal costs, all else equal, reducing monopoly profits in the advertising market. For
an ad-free magazine, a = 0, and (2) reduces to the standard one-product case, while (3)
is not relevant in this case. The publisher sets the monopoly price in the readership
market. For sponsored magazines, very low values of n or k may be observed. In the
extreme case, n = 0 implies that (3) reduces to the standard monopoly case, while (2) is
not relevant.
The above results for the advertising market change somewhat if one assumes that
readers value the total number of pages rather than the proportion of editorials to ads.
In the profit function, circulation then depends on n + a instead of k = n/(n+a). Equation
(3) is altered as shown in (3a)12
9In the period 1975 - 1995, the average time spent on reading magazines has decreased by 30 %,
compared to 20 % for newspapers and 25 % for books. The main reason for this reduction is a drop in the
number of readers, not a general decline of the average reading time. Explanations for this drop include the
wider supply of television programs, an increase in the number of people that have day duties and therefore
have no time or energy left at night to read, as well as the increasing competition from other leisure activities
(SCP, 1998, p. 707).
10According to VNU, the leading Dutch publisher, this reflects the trend of individualization in Dutch
society. The publication of more magazines is considered the only way to maintain the level of circulation








Marginal cost of producing ads are not added up as in (3) but subtracted. Equation (3a)
thus implies that the publisher will set an ad-rate that is lower than the monopoly ad-rate
if readers value the number of pages of a magazine rather than the proportion of
editorials to ads, and thus value advertising as information or entertainment. As before,
however, competition in one or both markets has a price-lowering effect.
This simple model has shown that magazine pricing and ad pricing are connected.
Further, it adds the insight that this link depends on
1. how readers value total magazine space and editorials vs. ads;
2. how advertisers react to changes in circulation.
Because markets are connected, pricing behaviour of publishers may deviate from
the standard one-product-one market textbook case. Particularly, below-marginal cost
pricing may emerge in the readership market as a natural outcome of pricing in
connected markets rather than that it is evidence for predatory pricing.
4. The Dutch market for consumer magazines
This section describes the Dutch market for consumer magazines during the period 1987
to 1998. The market for consumer magazines can be considered a saturated market.
Although the average income of the Dutch population has risen, the average time spent
reading magazines has decreased
9. Over the last two decades, publishers have gradually
switched from publishing general-audience magazines towards special-interest
magazines due to this demand saturation. Only a very limited number of today’s
magazines reach a circulation exceeding 500,000 copies. The main growth of circulation
in the market results from the publication of (new) special interest magazines
10. The13
11By law, these price lists are only available to NUV members. Media Center Group, a commercial media
agency based in Amsterdam, allowed us access to their archive of tariefkaarten. Luckily, Media Center
Group has not discarded "out-dated" price lists but has kept them safely stored away since 1991. These price
lists have a (nearly) standardized format ("card"), contain magazine information relevant to advertisers
(prices for different ad-formats, publication frequency, print-related information, minimum circulation, target
groups etc.) and are sent to media agencies (who place ads for clients) by the publishers. 
12SUMMO is the abbreviation for "Samenwerkingsverband voor het uitvoeren van multimedia
onderzoek", an organization based in Amsterdam that conducts regular surveys on media coverage and the
demographics of the respective media consumers (readers of newspapers and consumer magazines, TV and
radio audiences).
13The 1998 list of magazines as reported by NUV contains 553 titles, of which about 170 can be defined
as consumer magazines.
main characteristic of the market is thus a high degree of product differentiation, or in
other words, market segmentation.
4.1 Data and variables
Circulation-related information (paid circulation, subscriptions, newsstand copies etc.)
is available from the Dutch publishers’ association (NUV, Nederlands Uitgevers-
verbond) annual reports. Information on newsstand prices (cover price), prices for a
standard one-year subscription, and prices for standardized forms of advertising (full-
page black-and-white, full-page color ads, advertising rate) can be obtained from the
so-called "tariefkaarten" (Nederlandse Standaard Tarief Documentatie, NSTD)
11.
The demographic and socio-economic profile of a magazine’s readership can be
found in the SUMMO Scanner
12, which investigates in bi-annual panel surveys the
reading habits of Dutch consumers. For 1998, the SUMMO Scanner includes about 100
established consumer magazines, providing magazine-specific information on the share
in the readership (total, by gender, main provider of household income ("kostwinner"),
main shopper ("doet boodschap"), regional distribution of readers (top cities, North,
West, South and East) as well as the age and income structure of readership.
Unfortunately, none of the resources collects magazine-specific information on the
number of pages allotted to editorial and advertising. Issues of NUV-reports and the
SUMMO Scanner were available to us from 1987 on, "tariefkaarten" from 1991 on.
Based on the annual reports of NUV and own research we were able to identify 214
Dutch consumer magazines during the period 1987 to 1998
13. However, only for 71 of
these magazines complete information on circulation, prices and readership
characteristics could be collected for at least two consecutive years during the period14
1991 to 1998. This panel data set will be used in the regression analysis to be presented
in Section 5. Table 1 summarizes variables and data.
Table 1: Summary of variables and data sources
Variable Definition Source
Cover price Newsstand price in the 1
st quarter of each year Nederlandse Standaard Tarief Documentatie
(NSTD) (1991 - 1998)
Subscription price Price per issue charged in the 1
st quarter of each year
(standard one-year mail delivery subscription/number of
issues)
Nederlandse Standaard Tarief Documentatie
(NSTD) (1991 - 1998)
Advertising rate Full-page black-and-white ad, single-issue placement;
Full-page colour ad, single-issue placement
Nederlandse Standaard Tarief Documentatie
(NSTD) (1991 - 1998)
Circulation Paid circulation per issue (annual average) NOD, Nederlandse Standaard Tarief Documen-
tatie (NSTD) (1987 - 1998)
Newsstand copies Copies sold at newsstands/average paid circulation per
issue
Own calculation from NOD & NSTD data
Subscriber share Copies sold via subscriptions/average paid circulation per
issue
Own calculation from NOD & NSTD data
All readers Percentage of the SUMMO population of age 13 and
older that reads the respective magazine
SUMMO Scanner (1987 - 1998)
Income receiver Household’s main income provider/total readership (as
captured by SUMMO)
SUMMO Scanner (1987 - 1998)
Shopper Household’s main shopper/total readership SUMMO Scanner (1987 - 1998)






Readers with high (low) income/total readership SUMMO Scanner (1987 - 1998), based on
"Sociale Klasse" definition of the Vereniging
van Marktonderzoekbureau’s (VMO)
(1987 - 1998)
4.2 Market segments, magazines and publishers
Table 2 lists all magazines with complete data included in our panel data set. Further,
except for Avenue which ceased to exist in 1994, the table provides 1998 information
on the publisher, the publication frequency ("Freq."), market segment identification
("Seg."), paid circulation, cover price, ad-rate, and the magazine’s share in the total15
readership as captured by the SUMMO Scanner. The market segments are defined at the
end of the table.
Table 2: Sample of Dutch consumer magazines, selected characteristics, 1998
Magazine title Publisher Freq. Seg. Circulation Cover
price
Ad-rate Readership
Avrobode AVRO 52 1 783652 1.75 22432 9.3
Mikrogids KRO 52 1 466081 1.45 8384 7
NCRV-gids NCRV 52 1 403585 1.75 13328 7.1
Televizier AVRO 52 1 257219 1.95 9.896 5
Troskompas Audax 52 1 506800 1.5 10935 9.4
TV-Krant Audax 52 1 152423 1.25 6100 3.1
TV-Studio KRO 52 1 220524 1.75 7488 3.4
Vara TV-Magazine Vara 52 1 525699 1.5 16760 9
Veronica Veronica 52 1 1113116 1.95 25020 25.4
Visie Visie 52 1 165911 1.85 5000 3
VPRO VPRO 52 1 246298 2.5 4116 4
Elsevier Elsevier 52 2 133042 6.5 11365 4.6
HP/De Tijd Audax 52 2 41493 6.5 5970 1.9
Vrij Nederlnad Weekbladpers 52 2 79718 6.75 8664 2.9
FEM Elsevier 24 3 17436 13.95 5570 0.9
Intermediair VNU 52 4 247177 5.95 11480 4
Opzij Weekbladpers 11 5 80979 7.95 6283 2.2
Flair VNU 52 6 119224 3.2 9664 4
Libelle VNU 52 6 684076 3.25 39432 21.3
Margriet VNU 52 6 478088 3.25 31224 16.8
Viva VNU 52 6 136224 3.2 11160 4.7
Yes VNU 52 6 144456 2.95 11168 4.6
AvantGarde Audax 12 7 55399 5.95 8800 2.916
Table 2: Continued
Avenue (1994) VNU 12 7 22091 9.5 7272 0.8
Beau Monde VNU 12 7 115781 6.45 8648 1.7
Elegance De Telegraaf 12 7 62693 9.95 10200 3.1
Marie Claire VNU 12 7 97102 8.5 11736 2
Nouveau VNU 12 7 131239 8.25 15152 3.8
Knipmode VNU 12 8 144975 8.5 11192 5.3
Prive De Telegraaf 52 9 381817 2.7 13530 15.6
Story VNU 52 9 291671 2.55 13184 14.7
Weekend Audax 52 9 261671 2.5 7725 11.7
Mijn Geheim Audax 52 10 77043 2.95 2900 3.6
Aktueel Audax 52 11 112443 2.95 6650 10.7
Nieuwe Revu VNU 52 11 127802 3.95 13528 11.1
Panorama VNU 52 11 180311 3.5 16400 14.6
Penthouse Maga Sell 12 12 70100 8 10000 2.4
Playboy VNU 12 12 113158 8.25 13288 4.3
Man De Telegraaf 10 13 26431 9.95 5000 1.1
Autovisie De Telegraaf 26 14 57173 7.25 4882 2.8
Autoweek VNU 52 14 131487 2.85 9448 6
Moto 73 VNU 26 14 44036 6.75 3500 2
Motor Wegener 52 14 24281 4.95 3195 1.5
Break Out VNU 52 15 76509 3.45 8944 3.4
Fancy VNU 12 15 127681 4.95 9080 3.1
Hitkrant De Telegraaf 51 15 70237 3.5 5413 3.4
Kijk VNU 12 15 90938 7.35 11640 3.7
Oor De Telegraaf 24 15 35877 6.75 4725 1.4
Tina VNU 52 15 113024 2.5 6912 3.8
Donald Duck VNU 52 16 353805 2.35 17712 13.417
Table 2: Continued
Kinderen VNU 12 17 108765 6.95 9496 5
Ouders van nu VNU 12 17 98676 7.95 11700 6.9
Santé Quote 12 18 105000 5.95 9650 2.8
Top Santé VNU 12 18 76163 6.95 9088 3.3
Ariadne VNU 12 19 159668 7.25 9976 4.7
Doe het zelf VNU 12 19 143596 6.95 11.816 8.4
Eigen Huis &
Interieur
VNU 12 19 64844 9 9000 9.5
Residence De Telegraaf 10 19 48195 12.5 8066 1.5
VT Wonen VNU 12 19 220272 8.25 17416 11.2
Mijn Tuin VNU 10 20 186841 7.5 10408 5.6
Tip Culinair VNU 13 21 125239 6.95 12720 6
Voetbal Inter-
national
Weekbladpers 52 22 200763 4.65 11073 8
Sport International Weekblad pers 12 23 54101 6.5 4394 5.6
Bingo VNU 12 24 74839 5 5200 2.4
Grasduinen VNU 12 24 49517 7.95 7352 2.9
Het Beste Reader’s Digest 12 24 322956 7.5 16000 8.7
Autokampioen ANWB 26 25 56341 6.5 5136 4.4
Kampeer en
Caravan
ANWB 12 25 134903 8.95 5904 5.5
Kampioen ANWB 12 25 3333357 0 55584 42.3
Reizen ANWB 12 25 50589 8.95 3872 3.3
Waterkampioen ANWB 24 25 51791 8.95 4628 1.7
Definitions:
Freq. = publication frequency, issues per year (e.g. "52" means "weekly")
Seg. = market segment
1- 5 TV guides, opinion magazines, business press, business-to-business, women’s
opinion18
6-10 women’s weekly, women’s monthly, women’s hobby, gossip I (incl. VIP stories),
gossip II (private tragedies)11-15 men’s I, men’s II (incl. nudity), lifestyle, motoring,
youth
16-20 comics, family & upbringing, health, interior design & home improvement,
gardening
21-24 dining & wining, sports football, sports general interest, miscellaneous (very
specific niche magazines)
25 ANWB bladen
Others music & movies, sports special interest, computers and software, travel, hifi &
video, arts & antiques (not included because of insufficient information on magazines)
Circulation = Paid circulation per issue, number of copies sold at newsstands or via subscriptions
Cover price = newsstand price in Dutch guilders
Ad-rate = standard one-page black & white advertisement, one-time placement, no discounts,
no VAT, in Dutch guilders
Readership = magazine’s share in total readership, in per cent
Market segmentation, or horizontal product differentiation, is a pronounced feature of
the market for consumer magazines. We have refined the SUMMO classification of
magazines to define product groups that are as homogenous as possible regarding target
groups and content. We identified 29 different market segments plus two groups
collecting miscellaneous magazines. Two categories do not define a "homogenous" sub-
market in which titles can be seen as close substitutes. The first category refers to the
magazines published by the Dutch Touristic Association. It is unclear with which
consumer magazines the ANWB titles compete. The ANWB titles are basically
membership magazines with newsstand sales of less than 10 % of paid circulation. The
second category has been named "miscellaneous". Magazines in this category cater to
very different "niche demands" and cannot be defined as close substitutes that
approximately cater to the same readership.
Table 2 shows that circulation, prices, and readership shares vary substantially
across market segments. Glossy and gossip magazines as well as the comic Donald
Duck have the highest share in total readership.
The Dutch market for consumer magazines is characterized by a small number of
large players and a large number of very small players. Table 3 lists the leading
publishers as presented in the sample, the number of magazine titles included but also
excluded due to missing data, and the number of market segments served. Eight
independent publishers produced 60 of the 71 sample magazines and 81 of the 143
magazines which could not be considered.19
14Data is also available for 1993 to 1996. However, due to substantial changes in the industry
classification as well as reporting procedures it is not directly comparable to the earlier period.







1 VNU 33 33 16 3
2 Audax 7 11 9 3
3 De Telegraaf Groep 7 6 7 1
4 ANWB Media 5 2 2 -
5 Weekbladpers 4 6 5 1
6 Reed-Elsevier 2 5 3 1
7 Wegener-Arcade 1 13 1 3
8 Quote Publishing -Hachette/VDB 1 5 5 1
60 81
Other publishers 11 62
71 143
4.3 Profitability, entry, and strategic behaviour
Economic reasoning implies that entry will occur whenever positive economic profits
can be expected. Dutch publishers are rather silent on the returns on invested capital to
be earned in the market for consumer magazines. Table 4 therefore can only provide
descriptive statistics at the industry-level regarding profitability, as measured by
industry gross profits (turnover minus payroll and expenses for raw materials) divided
by industry turnover, firm size, measured by the number of employees, and the number
of firms that reported to the Dutch Statistical Office (CBS) in each year of the
observation period from 1978 to 1992. This industry data is aggregated from
confidential plant-level information collected by the Dutch Statistical Office
14.20
15For a detailed description see Hakfoort and Weigand (2000).




M N MANF M N MANF M N MANF
Mean 27.95 21.81 22.13 124 186 106 26 38 6976
Median 27.79 21.41 22.26 112 177 102 28 39 7836
Maximum 30.22 26.72 23.96 176 276 132 34 54 8176
Minimum 25.94 20.08 19.99 77 87 82 18 29 4936
Std. Dev. 1.54 1.88 1.24 36 59 19 5 7 1260
M Magazine publishers, industry no. 2722, Dutch standard industry classification1973
N Newspaper publishers, industry no. 2721, Dutch standard industry classification1973
MANF All manufacturing firms
Profitability [(Turnover - payroll - expenses for raw materials)/turnover]*100
Source: own calculations based on four-digit industry data provided by the Dutch Statistical Office (CBS)
Table 4 reveals that the average and median profitability of magazine publishers was
clearly higher than the respective profitability of both newspaper publishers and the
average manufacturing firm. Newspaper publishers were slightly less profitable than the
average manufacturing firm. The following graph shows that median profitability of
magazine publishers was substantially higher than the median profitability of the
average manufacturing firm during the whole observation period and also higher than
the median profitability of newspaper publishers after 1981.
A large number of new magazines is launched on the Dutch market every year. Of the
214 magazines identified during our data collection 62 magazines have been launched
since January 1997. In many cases, it has been one of the leading publishers listed in
Table 3 or another well-established publisher rather than an entering new publisher who
launched a new magazine
15. Entry by new or small independent publishers has occurred
very rarely and only in growing market segments such as "lifestyle" or in specific niches
such as "sports special interests". Given the profitability depicted above, established
publishers apparently have sufficient market power to keep costs of entry high for
potential entrants.21
16The three leading Dutch distribution companies are subsidiaries of the leading publishers VNU, Audax
and De Telegraaf, respectively.













It is difficult to assess whether magazine publishers enjoy substantial economies of
scale. The scale economies argument has been readily advanced in the literature to
justify horizontal concentration and mergers or acquisitions in the publishing industry.
With the tremendous technical progress due to the ICT revolution the scale argument
has lost its persuasiveness at least with respect to production. Desktop computer
publishing techniques, outsourcing of printing facilities and, most recently, information
gathering and exchange via the Internet favor both the existence of small publishers and
the entry of new publishers. Although launching a new magazine is associated with set-
up costs and other fixed costs, a high fraction of the costs incurred for each issue can be
expected to be marginal.
Absolute cost advantages of incumbent publishers in the magazine market may
result from a variety of sources. First, magazine publishers established in a specific
market segment, say women’s weeklies, have superior information about this market
compared to potential entrants. This experience obtained from learning-by-doing is also
relevant to launching a new magazine in the same differentiated market. Second, cost
advantages may be the outcome of well-established distribution channels to retail
outlets
16. Third, incumbent magazine publishers may enjoy cost advantages through
established contacts with suppliers of input factors, printing companies (if not owned
by the publisher) and advertisers.22
17Incumbents’ better access to external finance is in general the result of being around for a longer time
which allows for building up a track record, reputation etc. with potential financiers.
18See standard IO textbooks such as Tirole (1988) or Scherer and Ross (1990) for a detailed discussion.
In the case of predatory pricing, the incumbent sets a price below the rival’s average cost to drive him from
the market. In the case of limit pricing, the incumbent sets a price that is not attractive for potential rivals to
enter the market.
19There is evidence of an attempt not to accommodate entry but defend market share by reducing prices.
In 1995, an incumbent publisher Wegener-Arcade launched the gossip magazine Party which competes with
gossip magazines published by De Telegraaf, VNU and Audax. Before Party entered the market, these
publishers had raised ad-rates of their magazines continuously despite declining circulation. With the entry
of Party we observe substantial ad-rate reductions, first by De Telegraaf, then by VNU, while Audax kept
the ad-rate almost constant. 
Incumbents may also have first-mover advantages from product differentiation.
By  cornering a certain niche market and building up brand loyalty it is difficult for
potential entrants to enter the same market segment. The effect is strengthened by an
incumbent’s strategy of multi-title publishing.
Finally, launching a new magazine may require "deep pockets", that is, at any time
sufficient funds, either generated internally or acquired externally, have to be available
to finance the venture without putting other activities at risk. Incumbent firms usually
have not only a higher volume of internally generated funds but also better access to
external capital (bank loans etc.)
17. Therefore, it is not surprising that most new
magazines in the Netherlands have been launched by incumbent publishers.
Industrial organization theory highlights several entry-deterring strategies, such
as predatory and limit pricing or excess capacity
18 . Looking at the anecdotal evidence,
none of these strategies seems to have been used by Dutch publishers of consumer
magazines
19. However, strategies resembling incumbents’ behaviour discussed in the
literature on the economics of innovation have been used by the publishers. As shown
in this literature, it can pay off for the incumbent to wait with the introduction of an
innovation and "milk" his cash-generating established product, until entry is an
immediate threat. The incumbent has to be prepared to counter innovative entry
immediately as it takes place, that is, he himself has to take away demand from the
entrant. This "shelving" strategy is in its effects similar to predatory pricing. It may also
be used in the market for consumer magazines. New magazines are often targeted at
creating a new market segment. The launch can therefore be seen as an attempt at
product differentiation. For an incumbent firm, launching a new magazine is not very
attractive because in the face of stagnant advertising budgets and consumer demand for
magazines (which is the relevant situation for the Dutch market) it merely dilutes its
circulation and advertising revenues. However, if a new firm enters the market with a23
20There is anecdotal evidence that VNU, the market leader, has used the shelving strategy. In 1986, De
Telegraaf launched Vrouw in Beeld, a women’s weekly. A few days after the launch, VNU came on the
market with a magazine of the same format aimed at the same target group, Vrouw Nu. After only a few
months, Vrouw in Beeld disappeared from the market. VNU then decided to stop publishing Vrouw Nu
(Bakker and Scholten, 1999, p. 41). In 1994, Quote Media launched Santé, a health magazine. A few days
later, VNU came on the market with Top Santé, in a very similar format. To this day, both magazines are still
on the market. On September 9, 1998, Audax launched Vriendin, a women’s magazine aimed at the lower-
income groups. Again VNU responded quickly by launching Vrouw Vandaag, targeting exactly the same
readership (Hemels, 1998, p. 188), on September 17, 1998. In all three cases, VNU introduced a very close
product to make post-entry performance unprofitable or at least less profitable for the other publisher.
Clearly, from the perspective of VNU, defending its market position in such a way may be a legitimate and
smart business strategy. Whether a business strategy is legitimate from the perspective of competition policy,
however, depends crucially on how dominant a market player is, as the case against Microsoft shows. In the
case of VNU, at least some worries are warranted. This phenomenon is not unique to the magazine market.
In the newspaper market, the launch of the free newspaper Metro in 1999 lead to the launch of the free
newspaper Spits by De Telegraaf. 
"new format" magazine, it is rational for the established publishers to offer a substitute
and drive the rival out of the market.
In contrast to the "undercutting price" argument of predatory pricing, "predatory
product imitation" need not to be based on charging a price that is lower than, in the
extreme, the entrants marginal cost. It is sufficient to launch the substituting product,
charge the same price, and steal away demand from the new entrant to make entry
unprofitable. In addition, there is a long-run effect. The publisher can build up a
reputation for retaliating whenever an entrant attempts to establish a new magazine. The
(credible) threat of retaliation may discourage potential future entrants already from the
start
20 .
5. The empirical relationship between cover price, ad-rate and
circulation
The theoretical model outlined in Section 3 has highlighted that circulation constitutes
a link between the readership and the advertising market, thus affecting pricing
behaviour in both markets. In this Section, we explore the empirical relevance of this
link and try to answer the following questions: Are cover prices and ad-rates determined
by circulation? Do prices feed back on circulation?
The bottleneck of any empirical analysis that is guided by a theoretical model like
the one presented in Section 3 is always the availability of data to construct empirical
variables implied by the theoretical model. Unfortunately, important variables of the
theoretical model such as marginal cost, revenue from selling advertising space, or the
amount of space dedicated to editorials are not available for individual magazines. We24
do not even have sufficient balance sheet information on costs (to approximate marginal
costs by average variable costs) or revenue sources at the publishers’ level. However,
the panel data structure of our data set, that is, the combination of cross-sectional and
time-series information, allows us to control for systematic but unobservable influences
by including specific effects such as publisher- and time-specific effects.
5.1 The empirical model
The empirical model







relates the endogenous variable y, for which we will insert cover price, ad-rate, and
circulation, to a set of right-hand side variables x, among which will be, for instance,
readership characteristics.
The subscript i = 1, ..., 71 identifies the individual magazine and the subscript t =
1991, ..., 1998 denotes time periods. The parameter a indicates dummy variables that
stand for individual publishers (j = 1, ..., 17) or magazines (j = i), whereas 8 denotes
time-specific effects, u is a standard regression error. The k coefficients b will be
estimated by Least Square techniques (2SLS-instrumental variable, to account for the
potential simultaneity of right-hand side variables). All price variables have been
deflated by the implicit deflator of the Dutch Consumer Price Index (1991 prices).
5.2 The results
Table 5 reports the regression results for our preferred model specification in which we
assume cover price, ad-rate, and circulation to be jointly determined by a set of
exogenous (predetermined) variables to be discussed below. The upper part of the table
names the right-hand side variables included in the respective regression equations for
which the estimated regression coefficients are presented in Columns 2 to 4. The lower
part of the table contains test statistics which indicate (1) whether circulation, ad-rate,
or cover price are endogenous in the respective regression equations in which they are25
21 For details on estimation techniques and specification tests we would like to refer the interested reader
to econometric textbooks such as Hsiao (1986) and Baltagi (1995).
included as "explanatory" variables ("Wu-Hausman" test statistic), given a statistically
appropriate (valid) set of predetermined variables (instruments, "Sargan" test statistic)
21.
Pricing in the readership market (Table 5, Column 2)
We have specified cover price as a function of circulation, ad-rate, rivals, newsstand
copies, share of low income readers as well as publisher- and time-specific effects.
The empirical relationship between cover price and circulation might give some
further indication of whether substantial scale economies exist. As costs for maintaining
printing facilities, editorial staff etc. do not vary with circulation, and as these costs have
been claimed to be huge, it can be expected that the average cost curve declines rapidly
at low levels of sold circulation and flattens out with increasing circulation. Economic
theory predicts that competition will force publishers to pass cost savings on to the
readership and to advertisers in form of lower prices. If higher circulation reflects lower
per-copy costs, and competition is effective, magazines with a higher circulation should
have a lower cover price (Stigler, 1964). The regression coefficient on log circulation
should then be negative. This prediction is fully supported by the statistically significant
coefficient in Table 5.
If the ad-rate indicates that selling advertising space contributes significantly to
a publisher’s total revenue, we expect a negative relation between cover price and ad-
rate. As shown in the theoretical model in Section 3, cover prices should be higher
without revenues from advertising. In our regression the coefficient on the ad-rate is
significantly positive. Magazines that charged high ad-rates also charged high cover
prices. This seems to contradict the prediction from the model if we equate a higher ad-
rate with higher ad-revenue relative to the revenue from selling the magazine. However,
a higher ad-rate may rather indicate a lower share of ad-revenue. If the publisher exerts
market power in the advertising market by setting a higher price he will lose (some) ad-
demand given the standard negatively sloping demand curve. The ratio of advertising
revenue to revenue from selling the magazine may then become smaller, implying in the
terms of our model an increase in the cover price ceteris paribus.26
Table 5: Prices, circulation and competition
Estimated regression
coefficients
Variables Cover price equation Ad-rate equation Log circulation 
equation
Log circulation -2.1200 (12.19) 
*** 916.74 (3.06) 
*** -
Cover price - 630.10 (6.73) 
*** -0.0596 (3.11)
Ad-rate 0.0003 (6.42) 
*** --
Rivals 0.0288 (1.46) -105.06 (4.89) 
*** -
Subscriber share (t-1) - 1611.01 (2.80)
*** -
Newsstand copies (t-1) 1.5424 (4.05)
*** --
Total readership (t-1) - - 0.0276 (1.64)
High-income readers (t-1) - 270.15 (6.50)
*** -
Low-income readers (t-1) -0.1412 (5.74)
*** --
Top cities (t-1) - - 0.0222 (1.38)




*** 12.0519 (119.17) 
***
Publisher-specific effects F (16, 489) = 99.35
*** F (16,488) = 119.89
*** -
Magazine specific effects - - F (69,438) = 5829.92 
***
Time-specific effects F (7,490) = 6.19 
*** F (7,488) = 16.47
*** F (7, 490) = 10.74 
***
Sargan Chisq(101) = 94.56 [0.6613] Chisq (101) = 100.09 [0.5069] Chisq (101) = 86.64
[0.8449]
Wu-Hausmann Chisq (3) = 48.18 [0.0000] Chisq (3) = 91.55 [0.0000] Chisq (2) = 44.90  [0.0000]
Notes: 
Endogenous variables: cover price, ad-rate, log circulation
Exogenous variables: rivals, subscriber share (t-1), newsstand copies (t-1), total readership (t-1), high-
income readers (t-1), low-income readers (t-1), top cities (t-1), shopper (t-1)
Specific exogenous effects: magazine dummies, publisher dummies, time dummies (included as stated above)
Heteroscedasticity-consistent absolute t-values in parentheses
*** (
**, 
*) 0.01 (0.05, 0.10) level of significance
Sargan: test of instrument validity (p-values in brackets). Wu-Hausman: test of exogeneity of right-hand side variables (p-values in
brackets)27
22In more technical terms: The null hypothesis that cover price and log circulation are simultaneously
determined can not be rejected, given a Chisquare statistic of 3.83 and using a valid set of instruments
(indicated by an insignificant Sargan test).
The re-formulated profit maximization conditions of the theoretical model do not imply
any causal relationships per se but rather simultaneity. We tested whether circulation
and ad-rate can be considered exogenous to cover price in this regression. The so-called
Wu-Hausman test statistic does indicate simultaneity between cover price, circulation,
and ad-rate
22.
We have included the variable rivals which counts the number of independent
publishers - as far as it was possible to identify them - in each market segment and each
year. Our theoretical model implies that more competition in the form of a higher
number of independent suppliers in one of the two connected markets should lead to
lower prices in this market but may raise price in the other market - ceteris paribus. If
the market for readership is the competitive market, the opposite relationship between
cover price and rivals is implied. Then at the same time, however, we should observe
a negative impact of rivals on ad-rates.
The coefficient on rivals in the cover price equation is indeed positive but not
significantly so at conventional levels of significance. A look at the ad-rate equation,
which will be discussed in more detail below, shows that the number of rivals affects
the ad-rate significantly negatively. Taken together, these results below support the
impression that price competition takes place in the advertising market, whereas
publishers exercise market power in the readership market to raise prices.
A high share of newsstand copies in total paid circulation implies that a relatively
large part of circulation is subject to uncertain and fluctuating demand which may be
affected by cover price changes. Following standard price theory, we expect that under
demand uncertainty, the publisher sets a lower cover price than under perfect foresight.
Therefore, an inverse relationship between cover price and the share of newsstand
copies is implied.
However, as a higher subscriber share gives publishers more planning security, the
publisher has an incentive to set a higher cover price to reduce newsstand demand, but
to simultaneously reward magazine subscribers by offering substantially lower per-copy
prices via subscriptions. The implication of this argument is a positive relationship
between cover price and the share of copies sold via newsstands. For our data set we
indeed find a significantly positive coefficient which supports the latter argument.
We included the share of low-income readers, since magazine which attract more
readers from the low-income spectrum should have lower cover prices. This prediction
is also borne out by the empirical evidence. The coefficient on low-income readers is
negative and statistically significant.28
23As there are general differences in prices charged from newsstand buyers and from magazine
subscribers, we replaced cover price in an alternative regression run by a weighted average of cover price and
subscription price per issue. The weights are the shares in total paid circulation of copies sold at newsstands
and copies sold via subscriptions. The results are qualitatively the same and are not reported here.
24This hypothesis is equivalent with a positive circulation elasticity in the theoretical model.
As we do not have any information on publishers’ costs, we have included
publisher- and time-specific dummy variables to control for these unobservable but
systematic differences. These specific effects turn out to be highly significant as the
summary test statistics show
23.
Ad-pricing (Table 5, Column 5)
Ad-price is hypothesized to depend on circulation, cover price, rivals, subscriber share,
share of high-income readers, the share of shoppers, publisher-specific effects, and time-
specific effects.
Based on the economies of scale argument, we expect ad-rates to decline in
circulation. However, higher circulation may also attract more advertising. At a given
space dedicated to advertising, ad-rates should increase in circulation
24. Empirically,
circulation is indeed significantly positively related to the ad-rate. Cover price is also
positively related to the ad-rate. The Wu-Hausman test statistic confirms that cover price
and circulation are endogenous in the ad-regression. We have already discussed the
inclusion of rivals in the ad-equation in connection with the cover price equation above.
The subscriber share can be seen as an indicator of readers’ brand loyalty.
Magazines with a large share of subscribers and known readership characteristics should
be particularly attractive for advertisers, since uncertainty about reaching the targeted
readership is reduced. Magazines with a higher share of subscriptions can therefore be
expected to have a higher demand for advertising space so that advertising rates are
higher at any given circulation. The subscriber share has the predicted positive
coefficient which is also statistically significant.
The readership characteristics of a magazine should be extremely important for
advertisers. To capture the discretionary spending power of readers, which is what
advertisers are basically interested in, the ad-rate regression equation contains the share
of high-income readers as well as the share of readers identified as those mainly doing
the household’s shopping (shopper). For both variables a positive impact on ad-rates
can be expected and is supported by our estimates.29
25The alternative circulation regression equation with the weighted price-per-copy as right-hand side
variable is not depicted here for reasons for space. The estimates are qualitatively identical to the one with
the cover price.
Publishers offer not only discounts on repeated advertising but, more importantly, also
"package deals" and very customer-specific arrangements on which we do not have
information. The ad-rate we are using might thus not fully reflect that publishers which
are operating in different market segments may have cost advantages (scope economies)
and, due to a larger portfolio of magazines, are more attractive for advertisers altogether.
To account for such potential bias we have again included publisher-specific dummies
together with time dummies. Both sets of dummy variables are statistically highly
significant so their inclusion is clearly warranted.
Circulation regression (Table 5, Column 4)
The circulation equation includes the cover price but not the ad-rate, since there is no
logical argument for a direct link between the price charged for ad-space and readership
demand. Why should readers stop to buy a magazine when the ad-rate is raised? Of
course, there is the indirect link our theoretical model has highlighted. As argued above,
a higher ad-rate may reduce the share of ad-revenue relative to the share of revenue from
selling the magazine, thus affecting the cover price positively. The potential indirect
effect on circulation emanating from publishers’ pricing decisions in the advertising
market can therefore be expected to be picked up by the cover price.
Magazines with a higher cover price tend to have lower circulation. The
coefficient of cover price is statistically significant. Again the Wu-Hausman test statistic
is highly significant, or put differently, cover price is not exogenous to circulation. This
result completes the picture. Cover price, ad-rates, and circulation are jointly
determined.
The regression equation also includes the magazine’s share in the total readership
which should have a positive impact on paid circulation. Also a higher share of readers
from the big cities Amsterdam, Den Haag and Rotterdam (top cities) can be expected
to affect total paid circulation positively. Both coefficients have the expected sign but
are not statistically significant.
Of course, the quality and scope of content should affect readership’s demand and
thus circulation. As shown in the theoretical model, the number of editorial pages per
issue or, respectively the proportion of editorial pages to ad-pages, may be a reader’s
most important decision variable. As data on the allocation of pages to editorials and ads
were not available, we have included magazine-specific effects to pick up these
differences. The magazine-specific effects turned out to be highly significant
25.30
What can be learned from the regression results?
We tried to test the link between circulation and prices empirically. Given data
constraints, we could only explore some relationships implied by the theoretical model
of Section 3. To mirror the simultaneity of potential links between variables, as reflected
in the re-formulated profit-maximization conditions, we used a simultaneous equations
set-up for the regression analysis. In sum, the empirical evidence supports the view that
cover price, circulation and ad-rate are linked in ways consistent with the theoretical
predictions. The basic result is that publishers charge lower cover prices but higher ad-
rates for magazines with a higher circulation. There is also evidence that a large number
of independent publishers in a market segment reduces ad-rates but not necessarily
cover prices. Put differently, competition in the ad-market does not mean that publishers
compete on prices also in the readership market.
6 Conclusion
This study has empirically investigated the Dutch market for consumer magazines. As
shown in a simple theoretical model, it is profit maximizing for a publisher to use
pricing power in the advertising market to subsidize the price charged from the
readership if readers value content. The results from our regression analysis basically
support the strong link between circulation and pricing in the readership and advertising
market described by the theoretical model. Indeed, Dutch magazines with a higher
circulation are sold at lower cover prices, while ad-rates tend to be higher for these
magazines. As no magazine-specific cost data are available, it remains unclear whether
Dutch publishers exploit readers or advertisers by charging unduly high prices. Still, as
Dutch magazine publishers have not integrated other media like TV or radio to the
extent observed in other European countries, both consumers and advertisers have
independent alternatives to satisfy their demands.
Some activities of the leading Dutch publishers do raise concerns and definitely
warrant more attention in the future. Our study shows that magazine publishers have
enjoyed substantially higher profits since the late 1970s than either newspaper
publishers or the average manufacturing firm. On the cost side, our analysis does
suggest that magazine publishers are burdened with a fixed cost load that is not very
different from manufacturing. The case for highly concentrated market structures to
cope with fixed costs is thus not very strong. The market structure in Dutch magazine
publishing can be characterised as oligopolistic. Product differentiation in the form of
publishing special-interest titles is ubiquitous and on the rise, since the market has been
stagnating for quite some time. However, and contrary to what you expect following
economic theory, product differentiation has not led to something like a31
26In 1998, the Dutch antitrust authority (NMa, 1998) investigated Audax for not allowing a new entrant
access to the distribution channel. At the moment of writing, the decision by the NMa is still pending. This
example highlights the potential for anti-competitive behaviour.
monopolistically competitive market structure (in the sense of Chamberlin). Rather, a
few large publishers produce almost all the magazine titles. In some market segments,
as for example opinion magazines or glossies, a market structure with only a few large
suppliers can be found to exist. More worryingly, it seems to has been existing for many
years without really challenging entry from new suppliers. In the mentioned market
segments, we find some evidence that is more consistent with tacitly collusive pricing
behaviour than with Bertrand price competition (Hakfoort and Weigand, 2000).  Further,
anecdotal evidence suggests that the key players in the market have substantial market
power to shield their profits from being eroded by entry. The example of VNU’s
reaction to the launching of new magazine titles by rivalling publishers makes clear that
powerful publishers need not fight costly price wars but can resort to effective non-price
weapons to discourage new entrants. Even without such a more sophisticated analysis,
the general picture of barely any entry of new publishers, fairly stable market shares of
established magazines, and indications of higher than average profit margins at least
point at a lack of competition. The general picture is: why bother about a saturated
market that is well-protected by incumbents’ strategies? Therefore, publishers of
consumer magazines seem to enjoy a relatively quiet life.
Potential new publishers hoping to enter because of the ICT revolution facilitates
producing a magazine at lower cost than in the past, face at least two major entry
barriers. First, by producing substituting and complementary titles ("multi-title
publishing") the leading publishers have already occupied market niches that may have
been attractive for potential newcomers. Multi-title publishing and cross-media
activities (e.g. books, business information, TV etc.) enlarge the publisher’s "visibility"
and thus the ability to offer attractive "packages" of advertising opportunities to
advertisers. For example, if an advertiser wants to target a specific group of readers he
almost certainly finds a VNU magazine that has the preferred readership profile. If
advertising plays a major role for a new publisher to bring a magazine to the market, he
has to be prepared to enter two connected markets, the readership market and the
advertising market. But that may not be good enough to be viable in the longer term
because the magazine needs to be distributed.
Here the second entry barrier comes into play. Control over certain distribution
channels and outlets makes it harder for new publishers without deep financial pockets
to enter the market. Established publishers may block new rivals by simply having well-
functioning distribution systems at their disposal
26. In sum, new publishers, by using32
27In a saturated market into which entry is discouraged (e.g.,  by niche predation and advertisers who
seem more interested in mass than niches) a tendency towards the lowest common denominator content may
exist. Incumbents do not want to occupy all niches because the niches cannibalise on the profits from their
core magazines. However, even less wanted for incumbents is when other firms occupy these niches. This
can lead to unoccupied, potentially profitable niches at the expense of diversity.
advanced IC technologies, might be able to produce a magazine at low cost but
marketing and selling the printing magazine may be quite a different venture.
Taken together, policy makers should be on the look-out for anti-competitive
actions taking place in upstream or downstream markets. They should not be blinded by
arguments that support concentrated market structures based on the specificity of
information goods or by the argument sometimes advanced that diversity in content can
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Abstract
The study analyses the Dutch market for consumer magazines. Magazines share a
number of characteristics with other information goods: they are experience goods, non-
rival, have high fixed and low marginal cost, and content can be subsidized or sponsored
by advertising. We develop a simple theoretical model to show that, if readers value
content, it is profit maximising for publishers to use pricing power in the advertising
market to subsidise the price charged from readers. The empirical analysis is based on
a panel data set of 71 Dutch magazines over the period 1990 - 1998. The regression
results suggest that magazines with a higher circulation are indeed sold at lower
newsstand prices, while ad rates tend to be higher for these magazines. The analysis of
the market indicates that policy makers should be on the look-out for anti-competitive
actions taking place in upstream or downstream markets.   